The largest heist in history

The Largest Heist in History

October – December 2008

Building the Great Pyramid: The Global Financial Crisis Explained

This article was accepted as evidence and published by the British Parliament, House of Commons, Treasury Committee.

When the financial crisis erupted at the end of September 2008, there was an unusual sense of incredible panic among banking executives and government officials. These two establishment groups are known for their conservative, understated approach and, above all, their stiff upper lip. Yet at the time they appeared to the public running about like headless chickens. It was chaos. A state of complete chaos. Within a few weeks, however, decisions were made and everything seemed to returned to normal and back under control. The British Prime Minister Gordon Brown even famously remarked that the government “saved the world.”

But what really caused such an incredible panic in the establishment well known for its resilience? Maybe there are root causes that were not examined publicly and the government actions are nothing more than a temporary reprieve and a cover-up? Throwing good money after bad money, maybe?

Money Making Machine

In order to answer these questions we have to examine the basic principles on which the banking system operates and the mechanisms that caused the current crisis. Students at the A-level are taught about “multiple deposit creation,” It is the most rudimentary money creation mechanism for banks, which if administered properly serves the economy and public at-large very well. In the deposit creation process a bank accepts deposits and lends them out. But almost every lending returns soon to the bank as a deposit and is lent again. In essence, when people borrow money they do not keep it at home as cash, but spend it, so this money finds its way back to a bank quite quickly. It is not necessarily the same bank, but as the number of banks is limited (indeed very small) and there is — or was — a very active interbank lending. In terms of deposit creation the system works like one large bank.

Therefore, the same money is re-lent over and over again. If all depositors of all banks turned up at the same time there would not be enough cash to pay them out. However, such a situation is highly unlikely. Every borrower repays his loan and pays interest on it. In principle, the difference between a loan and a deposit interest rate is a source of the banks’ profit. Naturally, banks have to account for some creditors that will default and reflect it in the lending interest rate, or all the creditors who repay cover the costs of defaults. On top of it, the banks possess their own capital to provide security.

Fundamental to this deposit creation principle is the percentage of deposits that a bank lends out. The description above used a 100% loan-deposit ratio, meaning that all deposits are lent out. In traditional banking this ratio was always below 100%. For example, years ago, Westminster Bank (before it merged into National Westminster Bank), intended to lend out 86.5% of every deposit. For every £100 deposited, the bank lent out £86.5, while the remaining £13.50 was retained in the banks reserve with a small portion of it kept in the Bank of England. In practice, this ratio was the bank’s control tool on deposit creation process, ensuring that the amount of money supplied to the market was limited. According to this principle, for every £1 deposited, a bank lends out £0.865. After only 5 cycles the amount is reduced to below £0.50 and after 32 cycles it is below 1 penny. If this process continued forever the total amount of money lent out of a pound would be less than £6.41. With every cycle of deposit creation, a bank built up its reserves, ultimately collecting almost entire £1 for every £1 initial deposit. Added to capital repayments, interest payments on loans and the bank’s own capital base this system ensured that that there was always enough money in the bank for every depositor. For years banks worked as a confidence trick – the notional value of deposits and liabilities to be paid by the bank exceeded the value of money on the market. Since only a very small number of depositors demand cash withdrawals at the same time and almost all these paid-out deposits are deposited in a bank again quickly the banks ensured that every depositor got his money while circulating money in the economy and stimulating growth. The loan-deposit ratio was a self-regulating tool. As with every cycle it multiplies, the reduction of amounts created decreases exponentially and quickly. The faster the deposit creation cycles occur the faster the reduction progresses, thus accelerating with every cycle. The total “created” from the original £1 deposited in a bank is a finite, not more than £6.41 at the 86.5% loan-deposit ratio, backed by nearly £1 reserve. It is an inverted pyramid scheme starting from a fixed initial deposit base and quickly reducing through deposit creation cycle to zero.

Building a Pyramid

In a City bar back in 1998, an academic was discussing modern banking with his City colleagues from university. He was encouraged to invest in shares as their growth was well above inflation. He pointed out, however, that the inflation index does not take into account the growth of share price and as a consequence the market will run out of cash to pay for shares at some point. The only way would be down—a shares price crash. His City colleagues argued that there would be additional money coming in from different economies preventing a crash (a pretty thin argument in the world of global banking as foreign investors were already market players.) They also argued that the modern financial instruments allowed “securitisation”, “hedging” the risk and “leveraging” the original investment. Indeed it was a killer argument.

The deposit creation process is at the heart of the banking system servicing the public and stimulating economic growth. The modern banking instruments of securitisation, hedging, leveraging, derivatives and so on turned this process on its head. They enabled banks to lend more out than they took in deposits. According to Morgan Stanley Research, in 2007 UK banks loan-deposit ratio was 137%. In other words the banks were lending out on average £137.00 for every £100 paid in as a deposit. Another conservative estimate shows that this indicator for major UK banks was at least 174%. For others like Northern Rock it was a massive 322%. [For more details, refer to Table A.] Banks were “borrowing on the international markets” and lending money they did not have but assuming to have in the future. Likewise, “international markets” were doing exactly the same. At first sight it might not seem so much different than deposit creation. Deposit creation is lending money by the banks they do not have on the assumption that they will get enough back in sufficient time in the future from borrowers.

On closer examination there is a remarkable difference. With every cycle of the 86.5% loan-deposit ratio every £1 deposited is reduced becoming less than £0.50 after 5 cycles and less than 1 penny after 32. With a loan-deposit ratio of 137% — lending £137 for every £100 — not to mention 174% or indeed 322%, the story is drastically the opposite. Imagine a banker gets the first £1 deposit in the first week of a new year and lends it out. Imagine that twice every week in that year the amount lent out comes back to him as a deposit and he sustains such deposit creation process with a ratio of 137% twice every week for the year. This is a perfectly plausible scenario on the current electronic financial markets. By the following New Year’s Eve, the final amount he finally lends out from the original £1 is over £165 trillion (165 with 12 zeros, or over 16 times the amount governments have so far injected into economy). The total amount lent out in a year by a banker is over £447 trillion. Significantly with a loan-deposit ratio 100% or above no reserve is created.

It is an acknowledged monetary principle that the lending interest rate cannot be below 0%. This would allow borrowers to borrow money and banks would keep paying them for doing so. Indeed, there would be no incentive to lend and borrowing would have become a source of income for a borrower. Ultimately, lending would have stopped completely. It is a very similar principle that the loan-deposit ratio cannot be 100% or above, as in such circumstances, an amount of money coming from economic activities into deposit creation cycle would be multiplied very rapidly to infinity. Economic growth and inflation would not be able to catch up with it, which happens if loan-deposit ratio is below 100%.

The loan-deposit ratio below 100% that traditionally served as a very strict self-regulating mechanism of money supply stimulating the economy becomes a killer above 100%. The banking system becomes a classic example of a massive pyramid scheme. But as with every pyramid scheme, as long as people and institutions are happy not to demand cash withdrawals from the banks it is sustainable. Any bank can always print an impressive account statement or issue a new deposit certificate. The problem is whether the cash is there.

The qualitative and quantitative difference between loan-deposit ratio of 0% and 99% is infinitely smaller than between 99% and 100% or 101%. With ratios between 0% and 99%, we always end up with a money-making machine that creates a finite amount of money out of the initial deposit with a reserve nearly equal to the original deposit. If a ratio climbs to 100% or above the amount of money created spirals to infinity, if above 100% with exponential speed and no reserve is generated in this process. It is little wonder that Northern Rock which used the ratio of not less 322% collapsed first well ahead of others, HBOS with a ratio of around 175% ended up in a meltdown scenario later, while HSBC that used the ratio of not more than 91% was relatively safe (being a part of the global banking system, however, it has been at a risk stemming from the actions of other banks). [For more details, refer to Table A.]

Facing the Inevitable

For years the impressive-looking banks results brought a lot of confidence and the City was hailed as a beacon of the British economy. Bank executives, traders and financiers collected huge bonuses — not surprisingly, a lot of it in cash, rather than financial instruments. Influential economists and politicians alike justified stratospheric bonuses and hailed the City as the workhorse of the economy. Government strategic decisions were quite often subordinate to the objective of keeping the City strong. Irrational exuberance triumphed. Ultimately, City executives, traders and financiers proved to be pyramid purveyors not any more sophisticated (although perhaps better mannered) than their Albanian gangster counterparts who carried out a similar scheme 1996-97.

As with any pyramid scheme (and as long as there is still cash in the scheme) the beneficiaries are the operators of the scheme and “customers” who know when to get out of it. During the hectic dawn of the current financial crisis it is very likely that bank executives realised that it was the time that their pyramid started collapsing. This easily explains why banks stopped trusting one another and interbank lending collapsed. It was impossible to predict which node (financial institution) of a pyramid scheme would collapse next. There was a very distinct risk that if a bank lent money to another, the next day the bank-borrower may be bust and the money would be gone.

The collapse process, always an instant one, is accelerated by a dramatic loss of confidence amongst the pyramid customers. Once a single customer cannot withdraw his deposit, a great number of others start demanding payouts. City executives must have known this mechanism and explained to the government officials that unless the state shifts its weight injecting cash, guaranteeing deposits and lending, the system was bound to collapse. The Northern Rock case was a good dry run that pyramid purveyors gave government officials in September 2007. Facing a complete meltdown and an “Albanian scenario” the government acquiesced to the bankers’ demands by injecting cash on an unprecedented scale and giving wide guarantees.

The Route to Recovery

This is only the beginning of the story. According to some estimates there are around $2 quadrillion worth of financial instruments (like securities) that cannot be redeemed due to the lack of cash in the system — so-called toxic waste. These instruments are in the financial system and there are prospective beneficiaries of these instruments when they are redeemed, however. Furthermore they appreciate in value and attract interest so their notional value continues increasing over time. Governments around the world injected cash into the global banking system to a tune of around $10 trillion, or 200 times less than $2 quadrillion. At the same time they allowed bank executives and financiers who organised this pyramid scheme to remain at their posts to manage the injected money. Governments became the ultimate customers of pyramid purveyors with the hope that when they offer their custom it would somehow stop the giant pyramid scheme from collapsing. This is extremely naïve and very dangerous. The incredibly fast growth to infinity of pyramid schemes, which is only accelerating, will ensure that the government will not stand a chance to sustain it, unless this massive pyramid scheme is brought to a halt and liquidated. But there is no sign of governments contemplating doing that yet.

If governments do not liquidate the global pyramid scheme, the money they injected will be, in time, converted into toxic instruments (e.g. securities) and cashed in by organisers and privileged customers of these schemes (or in the case of Albania, gangsters and their customer friends). As the amount injected is around 200 times less than the notional value of toxic instruments, the economy will not even see a difference. It will be a step back to September 2008, only now with trillions of dollars of taxpayers’ money spent to sustain the pyramid scheme. It will be merely throwing good money after bad. But can governments afford to come up again with the same amount money and do it 200 times over or more? This is based on a very optimistic assumption that the notional value of toxic instruments is not increasing. If governments take the route of continuing to inject money, they will make taxpayers dependant on the financial system in the same way that criminal loan sharks control their customers — their debt is ever increasing and customers keep on paying forever as much as it is possible to extract from them.

In a normal free market economy a business that fails should be allowed to collapse. If a business is a giant pyramid scheme, like the current financial system, it must be allowed to collapse and its executives and operators should face prosecution. After all running pyramid schemes is illegal. Letting the banks collapse would have been a far more commercially sound solution than the current approach, provided the governments would have secured and guaranteed socially vital interests directly. For example, individual deposits would be guaranteed if a bank collapsed. Deposit accounts records, along with mortgage and genuine business accounts, would be moved to a specially created agency of the Bank of England which would honour them with government help. If a pension fund collapsed due to a bank collapse, individual pensioners would continue receiving their unchanged pensions from the social security system. This would guarantee social stability and a normal flow of cash into the economy.

The hard part would be to liquidate financial institutions while sifting through their toxic waste and to distinguish genuine non-toxic instruments and the results of pyramid scheme operation. Deposits, mortgages and business accounts are clearly non-toxic in principle. However, in the modern banking they were mixed with potentially toxic assets. This would be a gargantuan task.

The current “quantitative easing” (printing cash) is an attempt to convert more toxic instruments, like securities, into cash, albeit at some inflationary costs, and make them state-guaranteed, as cash is guaranteed by the state. It is just another trick of the financial pyramid purveyors to extract even more cash from taxpayers through the governments on the back of the scheme. Looking back to the 1990s, Albanian gangsters must feel really crossed considering that they were not offered such a “rescue” package first by Albanian government, and then by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

Unless and until the governments identify, isolate and write off toxic instruments held by financial institutions every pound put into “rescue” is very likely to end up being good money thrown after bad. (The governments, as ultimate customers of the global pyramid scheme, are supplying the pyramid purveyors and beneficiaries with tax payers’ cash and the largest heist in history continues.) Alongside the liquidation process, but after the toxic waste has been isolated and fenced off in failed financial institutions, governments must launch a fiscal stimulus package and go after the pyramid purveyors and beneficiaries to recover any cash and assets from them and bring them to justice. As the financial pyramid scheme is global, any action — including the recovery cash and assets — must be global, too. It is intriguing that banks in traditional offshore financial centres like Belize, US Virgin Islands, Bermuda, do not appear to suffer from liquidity problems. They do not require rescue packages even though a lot of them are subsidiaries of much larger banks which are affected by the current crisis. Is it a sheer coincidence that, for example, the loan-deposit ratio at US Virgin Islands banks is at a very prudent 42%? Little doubt there is a lot of cash there not created in those little economies. Mr John McDonnell MP [Member of Parliament in the UK] wrote in The Guardian on 20 February 2008:

“One series of offshore trusts associated with Northern Rock were called Granite (presumably a witty pun on the Rock bank). Granite holds approximately 40% of Northern Rock’s assets, around £40bn. Yesterday, the Treasury minister told the house that “Granite is and has always been a separate legal entity”.

Let’s look at that: Northern Rock does not own Granite, that’s true. It is however, wholly responsible for it: it’s officially “on” its balance sheet in its accounts. But it is legally “off” its balance sheet when it comes to getting hold of its assets as the basis for the security of the sums owed the Treasury.

Granite is based in Jersey, an offshore tax haven where Northern Rock’s best assets sit outside the reach of taxpayers. So the bill to nationalise Northern Rock will, in fact, be nationalising only dodgy debt, which will increase the burden on the taxpayer and put at risk the jobs of Northern Rock workers. The sad truth is that by failing to regulate the financial sector adequately, the government has been hoist by its own neoliberal petard. The participants in this tax dodge will be allowed to walk away with millions, when workers may lose their jobs and the taxpayer risk billions.”


Some economists see overvaluation of financial instruments as the root cause of the current financial crisis. Overvaluation was not a necessary factor, but only a contributory and accelerating factor that worsened the crisis. The crux of the matter is that financial institutions have considered financial instruments, like securities, as good as cash and added them as cash in the deposit creation cycles at a rate that brought the loan-deposit ratio to 100% or above. Without non-cash financial instruments considered as cash it is impossible to go above 100% in a deposit creation cycle. And it does not matter if these instruments were given proper risk characteristics individually discounting their notional, face value. As long as with any residual value, they have been added in deposit creation process to an extent that its ratio was 100% or above, the disaster was only a matter of time. Because of exponential character of the creation it was a matter of a short time.

Loan-deposit ratio above 100% is like (untreated) AIDS. As it progresses it weakens the immune system of economy that safeguards against adverse events: natural disasters, wars, etc or sometimes unpredictable mood swings of market players. The current crisis was triggered by the collapse of subprime mortgage market (effectively overvaluation of assets). This time the system, for years having had been weakened by loan-deposit ratio above 100%, also collapsed altogether. It was a giant pyramid and it was bound to crumble anyway (for whatever direct cause). It was like a human suffering from AIDS whose death was not caused by AIDS directly, but by pneumonia, flu, infection, etc. However it is AIDS that made the curable illnesses lethal.

Until recently the world enjoyed a sustained period of high growth and low inflation and the fact that it came to such an abrupt end does not come as a surprise. It was in the very nature of the pyramid scheme mechanism. The deposit creation process with a ratio above 100% guaranteed impressive-looking economic growth figures. At the same time there were no extra cash hitting Main Street, as there was no extra cash printed. In this context, the high growth of property prices is no surprise. In their huge majority and extent, these are, in practice, cashless interbank transactions. The world stayed oblivious in this economic miracle like customers of a pyramid scheme being happy with the figures on their statements until they wanted to withdraw money. But like with any pyramid scheme, the financial system ran out of cash, with the outcome of a lack of liquidity, not high inflation.



HSBC 90% 2.8%
RBS 112.3% 6.2%
Barclays 123.45% 6.3%
Lloyds TSB 140.84% 8.1%
Alliance & Leicester 172.41% 3.6%
Bradford & Bingley 172.41% 3.9%
HBOS 175.43% 20.1%
Northern Rock 322.58% 8.1%

Weighted average LOAN/DEPOSIT RATIO = 174.26%

Additional information:

– the RBS position includes ABN AMRO – without it RBS position was around 135%

– Abbey position after acquisition of Bradford & Bingley was 75%


UK 137%
Germany 121%
USA 105%
France + Benelux 103%
UK + Asia 89%


[source: Asian Banks? Is Credit Crunching Asia. –

Singapore, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, India, India, Indonesia Thailand, China. Hong Kong had loan/deposit ratio between 80% – 60%, whilst South Korea had nearly 130%.



Below is a draft of explanation (in a rigorous way) why financial institutions, technically, complied with Basel 1 and/or Basel 2 of capital requirements (8%), yet they collapsed.

1. Definitions: CR(T) – total capital held (requirements by Basel @ minimum 8%); CR(I) – capital held in financial instruments (taking into account risk, i.e. discounting for it); CR(C) – capital held in cash; L/D – loan to deposit ratio.

2. CR(T) = CR(I) + CR(C); when L/D is above 100% then CR(C) portion of CR(T) tends to 0; this means that a ratio of cash reserves to balance sheets also goes to 0. It happens with exponential speed (i.e. this process constitutes a pyramid scheme). In practice, this means that in banks balance sheets growing at exponential rate (base above 1), there is less and less cash, i.e. cash reserve to balance sheet ratio also goes to 0 at exponential speed.

3. Initially in the first phase, this process sucks the cash out of reserves, CR(C), and replaces them with instruments (so-called assets) CR(I) as CR(T) has to be maintained. The initial gains and increase in values of assets CR(I) is achieved with additional liquidity on the market (at the costs of CR(C) depletion). This drives the price of assets that constitute CR(I) high.

4. The assets of CR(I) are valued using price-to-market method. This creates a lethal cycle: the higher assets of CR(I) go up, the more cash of CR(C) is sucked from bank reserves, which results in even higher assets of CR(I) valuation (in price-to-market model). This cycle has exponential growth of cash, CR(C), being sucked out of the banking system, therefore, by definition, it is a pyramid. This constitutes a period of exuberant growth. However it is a bogus growth: statistics are induced by incredibly fast growing balance sheets and consumer confidence is induced by temporary massive availability of cash (being sucked out from cash reserves, CR(C)).

5. Like in any pyramid, as long as there is still enough cash in the banking system to sustain high price to market CR(I), it allows financial institution to maintain the right level of capital requirement of CR(T), technically complying with Basel 1 and Basel 2. However the element of CR(C) of CR(T) becomes smaller and of CR(I) becomes larger. A ratio of cash to balance sheets gets smaller at exponential speed, i.e. it is a pyramid scheme.

6. Any pyramid scheme collapses when due to an exponential speed of growth of balance sheets, availability of cash becomes inadequate. This creates the second lethal cycle: due to shortage of cash confidence goes down, value of assets CR(I) valued at price to market goes down, this creates a necessity for bank to start withholding cash supply to make up for the fall of CR(I) with CR(C) to comply with CR(T), which leads to even greater lack of cash and further loss of confidence and so on. And the cycle becomes a meltdown.

7. With L/D ratio below 100% such cycles look completely different. For example if CR(T) is 8%, L/D ratio of 92%. Using financial instruments as part of capital requirement does not lead to an exponential growth of balance sheets but it is always limited by a final amount of money. In case of CR(T) 8% and L/D 92% the total money put in circulation from $1 is $12.5. (Unlike when L/D ratio is above 100% this becomes massive. Technically it can even go to infinity.) Therefore price to market method works as valuation method when L/D is below 100% as it reflects cash in circulation at all times, rather than inflated and continuously growing balance sheets when L/D ratio is above 100% (see paragraph 4 above). Interestingly HSBC kept L/D ratio at 90%, thereby assuring 10% CR(T) but importantly with L/D below 100%.

8. When L/D ratio is below 100% an economic crisis is a readjustment sometimes even caused by consumers’ confidence. That is why in such situations consumers are encouraged to spend as the cash they hold rebalances back cash to balance sheets and CR(T) ratios to correct level.

9. When L/D ratio is above 100%, at a point of collapse consumers are very short of cash to spend and big debts, banks do not have money anymore to lend as any cash put in as deposits by the consumers (or injected by government) has to rebalance the balance sheets to get CR(T) to a right level. Due to a huge disparity this rebalancing process is ineffective and it is unrealistic to expect it to be effective. (Over $2 quadrillion of unbalanced balance sheets was thus far met to around 1%.)

10. Example: when L/D ratio is below 100%, price to market valuation of companies reflects their fair value. Normally if an investor wants to take over a company he has to pay a premium (as control has a value to an investor). When L/D ratio is above 100% after a point of collapse, even depressed price to market valuation of companies overall does not reflect a market value, but actually overvalues them. If an investor wants to take over a company for cash he is likely to negotiate a good discount (as the market is cash hungry).

11. One can generalise: when L/D is below 100% price-to-market valuation method reflects market liquidity with an element of confidence factored in it; when L/D is above 100% (or equal) price-to-market valuation method reflects misguided confidence in banks balance sheets until a collapse of this pyramid.


1. The analysis above is not made with benefit of hindsight: anyone who understands basics of computational complexity (issues around Cobham’s Thesis) would have done it 10 years ago. Therefore avoiding the exiting crisis was extremely trivial.

2. This analysis is deterministic and events are predictable. The exact point of collapse is not easily predictable, but since it is a pyramid scheme it is inevitable in short time. (I.e. it was as predictable as Albanian pyramid scheme collapse.) It appears to be a reason why lawmakers made it illegal.

3. It is clear that there was no failure in terms of law and regulations: Basel 1 and Basel 2 stipulate CR(T) at 8% and pyramid schemes, i.e. L/D ratios above 100%, are outlawed. The failure came from non-enforcement of existing law and regulations.

4. The rigorous mathematical proofs and quantitative analysis is available on request. You may also wish to look into a basic example how it all works.

More info for understanding
Loan to deposit ratio and banks liquidity

(This article is a technical analysis dedicated to the CEO of one of the largest and most famous banks in the world, referred to in the article “Liquidity risk”, who took care to write to the author of this blog.)

The key issue about banks liquidity is money multiplier. Money multiplier is a ratio of banks balance sheets to cash in circulation. It answers a question: how many pounds on the banks balance sheets does £1 real cash has to cover?

When a loan to deposit ratio is below 100% a money multiplier (MM) is expressed by a formula: MM = 1/(1-LTD) where LTD is loan to deposit ratio expressed in decimal terms. The loan to deposit ratio can fluctuate: i.e. if LTD is 50% then MM is 2, if LTD is 75% then MM is 4, if LTD is 90% then is 10, if LTD is 99% then MM is 100.

Ultimately, if loan to deposit ratio is always kept below 100% then, at any one time, the ratio of total loans to total deposits on the books gives an average loan to deposit ratio (ALTD). This average may be done for a particular bank or for a group of banks or for entire economy. A money multiplier calculated on the basis of such average, 1/(1-ALTD), is a measure of a particular bank’s liquidity, a group of banks liquidity or entire economy liquidity position. A bank’s CEO can look at such figure and have an immediate good idea about the liquidity of his bank. A Chancellor of the Exchequer (a Minister of Finance) may look at such figure calculated on the basis of total loans and total deposits for all banks and have a good idea of the liquidity of the banking system.

This money multiplier can be then considered within a concept of “stickiness” of different types of money deposited in banks (current accounts, deposit accounts, investments, etc). The lower the money multiplier the higher the “stickiness” of any kind of deposits. In other words, if £1 real cash covers lower amount of pounds on the banks’ balance sheets, the likelihood (under the same circumstances) that a bank will not have sufficient cash to cover the demand for withdrawals is lower than if £1 real cash covers higher amount of pounds.

Therefore if loan to deposit ratio is below 100%, the lower the loan to deposit ratio, the lower the money multiplier, the higher the “stickiness” of funds and the lower the liquidity risk. A ratio of total loans to total deposits gives a money multiplier at any one time and a good idea about underlying liquidity risk. Then a consideration can be given to “stickiness” of individual financial products (from current accounts to long term investments such as pensions).

When a loan to deposit ratio (LTD) is above (or equal) 100%, money multiplier (MM) is infinite. Of course it does not make sense to state that £1 of real cash has to cover infinite amount of pounds on banks balance sheets, at any one time, but it would be so if this continued forever. If a LTD is above (or equal) 100% then we have to calculate MM based on the number of deposit – loan cycles. For example if LTD is 100% and initial deposit is £1, after 20 deposit – loan cycles, this £1 has to cover £20 on the banks balance sheets and after 220 deposit – loan cycles, this £1 has to cover £220 on the banks balance sheets and so on. This is a staggering but still linear growth. If LTD is above 100%, then the financial system becomes a classic example of a pyramid scheme. For example if LTD is 117% and initial deposit £1, after 20 deposit – loan cycles, this £1 has to cover over £130 on the banks balance sheets and after 220 deposit – loan cycles, this £1 has to cover over £5.89 quadrillion on the banks balance sheets and so on. This is a runaway exponential growth.

As it is a cycle, whereby deposits become loans which become deposits and so on, if loan to deposit ratio is above (or equal) 100%, the higher loans result in deposits that result in even higher loans and so on. Therefore in terms of liquidity if at any one time a ratio of total loans to total deposits is taken (which is higher than one) – per bank, a group of banks or entire financial system – it does not give any idea about the prevailing money multiplier as, unlike when loan to deposit ratio is below 100%, it also depends on a number of deposit – loan cycles and loan to deposit ratio of each of them. Therefore a bank’s CEO or a Minister of Finance does not have an idea about the liquidity based on total loans to total deposits ratio. Perversely, model-wise for the sake of clarity of argument, if there were, say, 20 full cycles with loan to deposit ratio of 117% followed by a full cycle of 0%, then the total loans to total deposits ratio would be below 100% whilst money multiplier would be over 130, i.e. liquidity would be extremely fragile. (It should be noted that whilst deposit – loan cycles do not occur in such a uniform, synchronised, way, the model presented gives an accurate account of how they work and what outcomes they produce in reality.) For example information that a bank reduced loan to deposit ratio from 138% to 129% does not carry information whether its liquidity improved or got worse. If a bank stopped giving loans and started keeping deposits building up liquidity buffer, this would imply that liquidity improved. However if a bank continued to lend with, say, loan to deposit ratio of 105% which could have resulted in overall reduction from 138% to 129% (total loans to total deposits), this would have implied that liquidity actually got worse. As presently the banks have reduced lending heavily, the former rather than latter seems to be the case (but this is a guess) and it is foolish of the government to expect banks to lend more.

We know however that a money multiplier keeps growing very fast (at exponential pace, i.e. it is a pyramid scheme, if loan to deposit ratio is above 100%), and if this continued forever, ultimately, £1 real cash would have to cover the balance sheets that would be infinitely high. As this is impossible, a liquidity crunch is 100% certain in a finite time.

It follows that if loan to deposit ratio is above (or equal) 100%, the higher the loan to deposit ratio, the faster the money multiplier growth. However, in any event, the liquidity risk is 100% in a finite time. It follows that the traditional notion of “stickiness” of funds becomes vacuous as no funds are “sticky” anyway. It is a question when (in a finite time) and in which part of the system the liquidity crunch starts. This depends on various factors such as access to information or sophistication of depositors/investors in particular financial products who realise first that £1 real cash cannot cover ever growing, and without a limit, banks balance sheets and decide to withdraw their funding first. Therefore it is not surprising at all, in the context of the current financial crisis, that traditional retail deposits turned up more “sticky” than wholesale, investment-based, funding.

Example/exercise – how does it work?

For those who cannot visualise how lending with loan to deposit ratio above 100% pumps out cash of bank reserves and creates a financial pyramid below is a simplified example based on two banks financial system. Please go with pen and paper line by line and follow the growth of bogus balance sheets.

1. Two Banks A and B are set up. Both have zero on deposit and loan books. Bank A has $104.91 and Bank B has 166.38 cash reserves. They have no non-cash reserves. Both decide to lend with loan to deposit ratio (L/D) 130%. i.e.

Bank A:
– Capital reserves: $104.91 cash and $0 non-cash
– Deposits: $0
– Loans: $0

Bank B:
– Capital reserves: $166.38 cash and $0 non-cash
– Deposits: $0
– Loans: $0

2. Bank A takes $100 as deposit and decides to lend $130 (i.e. at L/D 130%). This loan (as all other loans in this example/exercise) are mortgages secured on residential properties. Bank A decides not to deplete its own cash reserves but borrow additional $30 from Bank B. Bank B considers this loan from its reserves with risk 50% and Bank A also considers the $130 loan with the risk 50%. (In fact both loans can be deemed as secured on properties, so 50% is in compliance with Basel.)

Therefore the both banks’ books look as follows:

Bank A:
– Capital reserves: $104.91 cash and $65 (i.e. $130 x 50%) non-cash
– Deposits: $100
– Loans: $130

Bank B:
– Capital reserves: $136.38 (i.e. $166.38 – $30) cash and $15 (i.e. $30 x 50%) non-cash
– Deposits: $0
– Loans: $0

3. Someone who took $130 loan from Bank A paid it to Bank B. The Bank B decided to lend $169 (i.e. at L/D 130%) not depleting its own cash reserves. It borrows additional $39 from Bank A. Bank A considers this loan from its reserves with risk 50% and Bank B also considers the loan of $169 with the risk 50%.

Therefore the both banks’ books look as follows:

Bank A:
– Capital reserves: $65.91 (i.e. $104.91 – $39) cash and $84.5 (i.e. $65 + $39*50%) non-cash
– Deposits: $100
– Loans: $130

Bank B:
– Capital reserves: $136.38 cash and $99.50 (i.e. $15 + $169*50%) non-cash
– Deposits: $130
– Loans: $169

4. Bank A takes $169 (lent by Bank B) as deposit and decides to lend $219.70 (i.e. at L/D 130%). Bank A decides not to deplete its own cash reserves but borrow additional $50.70 from Bank B. Bank B considers this loan from its reserves with risk 50% and Bank A also considers the $219.70 loan with the risk 50%.

Therefore the both banks’ books look as follows:

Bank A:
– Capital reserves: $65.91 cash and $194.35 (i.e. $84.5 + $219.70*50%) non-cash
– Deposits: $269 (i.e. $100 + $169)
– Loans: $349.70 (i.e. $130 + $219.70)

Bank B:
– Capital reserves: $85.68 (i.e. $136.38 – $50.70) cash and $124.85 (i.e. $99.50 +$50.70*50%) non-cash
– Deposits: $130
– Loans: $169

5. Bank B takes $219.70 (lent by Bank A) as deposit and decides to lend $285.61 (i.e. at L/D 130%) not depleting its own cash reserves. It borrows additional $65.91 from Bank A. Bank A considers this loan from its reserves with risk 50% and Bank B also considers the loan of $285.61 with the risk 50%.

Therefore the both banks’ books look as follows:

Bank A:
– Capital reserves: $0.00 (i.e. $65.91 – $65.91) – cash and $227.30 (i.e. $194.35 + $65.91*50%) – non-cash
– Deposits: $269
– Loans: $349.70

Bank B:
– Capital reserves: $85.68 cash and $267.65 (i.e. $124.85 + $285.61*50%) – non-cash
– Deposits: $349.70 (i.e. $219.70 + $130)
– Loans: $454.61 (i.e. $285.61 + $169)

6. Bank A takes $285.61 as deposit and decides to lend $371.29 (i.e. at L/D 130%). Bank A decides not to deplete its own cash reserves but borrow additional $85.68 from Bank B. Bank B considers this loan from its reserves with risk 50% and Bank A also considers the $371.29 loan with the risk 50%.

Therefore the both banks’ books look as follows:

Bank A:
– Capital reserves: $0.00 – cash and $412.94 (i.e. $227.30 + $371.29*50%) – non-cash
– Deposits: $554.61 (i.e. $285.61 + $269)
– Loans: $720.99 (i.e. $349.70 + $371.29)

Bank B:
– Capital reserves: $0.00 (i.e. $85.68 – $85.68) cash and $310.49 (i.e. $267.65 + $85.68*50%) – non-cash
– Deposits: $349.70
– Loans: $454.61

7. After these operations the system looks like:

– cash taken from the banks is the last loan: $371.29

– cash reserves held by both banks is $0.00 (i.e. no cash reserves – cash is gone from the banks)
– non-cash reserves: $723.43
– combined reserves: $723.43

– deposits: $904.31
– loans: $1,175.60 borrowed to pay for assets (which were booked with 50% risk discount as banks capital).

Having started with $271.29 reserves (Bank A $104.91 plus Bank B $166.38) and $100 initial deposit, the Banks A and B have no cash any more. If someone who is paid with the last loan of $371.29 keeps it as cash, he can start cherry picking the assets. They all cost $1,175.60 to buy. As, apart from his $371.29, there is no liquidity on the market, he can drive the price of the assets down (making them crash) and drive banks into bankruptcy (unless a government bails them out:-)

The loan to deposit ratio above 100% destroys banks’ cash reserves pushing liquidity on the market, inflating the assets price and ballooning the balance sheets, whilst below 100% cash reserves are guaranteed. However, on the books in this example, the banks’ $723.43 non-cash booked reserves to $904.31 deposits look extremely healthy. Unfortunately the assets booked at $723.43 have very little value. As there is no more liquidity their price goes to the floor: they become toxic assets.

This is a simplified model of the current liquidity crisis and assets value crash. It also shows why cash is the king on the current markets.

Therefore Basel compliant banking system went bust. But this is not a full story: this system was also a pyramid scheme, therefore illegal. Basel regulations have to be looked at in conjunction with law that prohibits pyramid schemes. And they together were sufficient to prevent the current crisis. However they were breached by financiers, regulators and government officials.

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